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CHURCH EMPLOYMENT AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: THE
PROTECTED EMPLOYER AND THE
VULNERABLE EMPLOYEE
Madsen v. ErwinI
When an employer dismisses an employee, most Americans would believe
that the dismissal should be based on the employee's job performance, not
on his or her personal lifestyle. However, when the employer is a religious
institution 2 protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution, 3 recent
case law has established that an employee who is dismissed solely on the
basis of his or her lifestyle has little recourse against the employer. Through
the case of Madsen v. Erwin,4 this Note analyses the free exercise' and es-
tablishment clause6 protections accorded a religious institution that dismisses
an employee because that employee's personal lifestyle violates church tenets.
Christine Madsen, a member of the Church of Christ, Scientist, was
employed as a sportswriter for the Christian Science Monitor. In December
of 1981, the editor of the Monitor, Earl W. Foell, discussed with the quality
control editor, Pamela 0. Marsh, a rumor that Madsen had asked a man-
ager's wife to accompany her to a lesbian organization meeting, or had
approached the manager's wife about having a lesbian affair.7 When* Marsh
confronted Madsen with the rumor, Madsen denied the alleged actions, but
admitted that she was a lesbian.8 Marsh later confronted Madsen with a
rumor that Madsen had changed her name because of a homosexual marriage.
Madsen also denied this rumor.9
Marsh and Foell met with Anthony Periton, the manager of the Christian
Science Publishing Society, to discuss the rumors. 0 Periton subsequently met
1. 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985).
2. The terms religious institution, church, and religious organization will be
used interchangeable throughout this Note.
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .
4. 395 Mass. 715, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985).
5. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
6. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .. .
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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with Madsen and demanded to know if the rumors were true. Madsen denied
the rumors, but admitted that she was gay."2
Periton again met with Madsen and asked Madsen if she would heal
herself of her homosexuality. Madsen refused. 3
Subsequently, Madsen met with Karen Gould, the employee relations
manager for the Christian Science Church. Gould informed Madsen that the
church was concerned about Madsen's homosexuality.' 4 When Gould asked
if Madsen was seeking healing, Madsen replied that she was not.' 5 Gould
informed Madsen that she had the choice of resigning or being fired if she
persisted in her refusal to be healed.' 6
Madsen neither resigned nor sought healing. She was dismissed with
severance and vacation pay.' 7 A note was included in Madsen's personnel
file stating that she would not be rehired unless "a radical change in views
on homosexuality takes place."' 8
Madsen commenced an action 9 for declaratory and injunctive relief and
for damages, alleging "wrongful discharge, defamation, invasion of privacy,
intentional infliction of mental distress, sexual and affectional preference
discrimination, and breach of fiduciary responsibilities under deeds of trust."2 0






16. Id. at -, 481 N.E.2d at 1169.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Madsen's complaint listed as defendants the trustees of the Christian Sci-
ence Publishing Society, the board of directors of the First Church of Christ, Scientist,
in Boston, Massachusetts, and the individual Christian Science Publishing Society
employees involved in Madsen's dismissal. Id. at -, 481 N.E.2d at 1160.
20. Id. at -, 481 N.E.2d at 1161.
21. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § 11H (West Supp. 1985) provides:
Whenever any person or persons, whether or not acting under color of
law, interfere by threats, intimidation or coercion, or attempt to interfere by
threats, intimidation or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any
other person or persons of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the
United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the com-
monwealth, the attorney general may bring a civil action for injunctive or
other appropriate equitable relief in order to protect the peaceable exercise
or enjoyment of the right or rights secured. Said civil action shall be brought
in the name of the commonwealth and shall be instituted either in the
superior court for the county in which the conduct complained of occurred
or in the superior court for the county in which the person whose conduct
complained of resides or has his principal place of business.
Id.; MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 12, § IllI (West Supp. 1985) provides:
912 [Vol. 51
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the Massachusetts right to privacy statute, 2Z Massachusetts common law, the
Massachusetts Constitution and the United States Constitution.23
The defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment was
denied by a judge of the superior court. 24 Defendants appealed the denial
and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed, directing entry
of summary judgments for defendants with respect to Madsen's claims under
the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions, her claims under the
Massachusetts civil rights statutes, and her claims for breach of contract and
wrongful discharge. 25 In ordering summary judgments, the court viewed the
Monitor's decision to fire Madsen as a religious decision made by a church
employer to which the court was bound to defer.26 However, the court af-
firmed the lower court's denial of summary judgments on Madsen's right to
privacy claim and her tort claims of defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, interference with advantageous relations and interference
with her employment contract, directing that Madsen be permitted to replead
these torts in a manner sufficient to state a cause of action. 27
The threshold inquiry the court addressed in determining whether the
Monitor's dismissal of Madsen was protected by the First Amendment was
whether the Monitor was a religious endeavor of the Church of Christ,
Scientist. 28 The court relied on an affidavit submitted by the Church's per-
sonnel manager which stated that the Church's personnel office was in charge
of the personnel at the Monitor, a memorandum on sexual morality that
Any person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the consti-
tution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws
of the commonwealth, has been interfered with or attempted to be interfered
with, as described in section 1 1H, may institute and prosecute in his own
name and on his own behalf a civil action for injunctive and other appro-
priate equitable relief as provided for in said section, including the award
of compensatory money damages. Any aggrieved person or persons who
prevail in an action authorized by this section shall be entitled to an award
of the costs of litigation and reasonable attorneys' fees in an amount to be
fixed by the court.
Id.
22. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 1B (West Supp. 1985) provides:
A person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious
interference with his privacy. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in
equity to enforce such right and in connection therewith to award damages.
Id.
23. Madsen, 395 Mass. at __ , 481 N.E.2d at 1161.
24. Id.
25. Id. at __, 481 N.E.2d at 1167.
26. Id. at __, 481 N.E.2d at 1165.
27. Id. at , 481 N.E.2d at 1167.
28. Id. at __, 481 N.E.2d at 1163.
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was distributed to all Church employees including those working at the Mon-
itor, and an employment badge issued to Madsen that was to be worn during
her employment by the Church. 29 Also submitted were authenticated copies
of Madsen's employment application to the First Church of Christ, Scientist;
the employee handbook which provided that the Church would employ only
members of the Church in its activities, including the Christian Science Pub-
lishing Society; and Madsen's employment badge labelled "First Church of
Christ, Scientist, Boston." 30 The court ruled that the plaintiff's affidavit,
which stated that the Monitor was not an organ of the Church, was insuf-
ficient to rebut the clear inference that the Monitor was a religious activity
of the Church of Christ, Scientist.3'
Based on previous rulings regarding the Monitor's status as a religious
organization, Madsen had little chance of convincing the court that the Mon-
itor was not entitled to First Amendment protection.12 However, the question
of an employer's status as a religious organization is not always so clear-
cut. As the court in Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor33 stated, "[n]ot
every endeavour that is affiliated, however tenuously, with a recognized re-
ligious body may qualify as a religious activity of that body and come within
the scope of protection from governmental involvement that is afforded by
the First Amendment.3 4
It is possible that an organization affiliated with a recognized religion
could become so secularized that it should no longer be viewed as a religious




32.' In Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass.
1983), the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found the
conclusion inescapable that the Monitor was a religious activity of a religious orga-
nization. Id. at 978. The court stated that although the Monitor had a recognized
position and established reputation in the secular world, "a religious activity of a
religious organization does not lose that special status merely because it holds some
interest for persons not members of the faith, or occupies a position of respect in
the secular world at large." Id. The court also noted that numerous administrative
bodies, including the EEOC, the IRS, the Department of National Revenue of Can-
ada, the state income tax administrators for Illinois and Massachusetts and the District
of Columbia unemployment compensation board had found the Monitor to be a
religious activity. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 978.
35. In NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981), the
court held that a children's home originally established in 1905 as an orphanage
exclusively for members of the Christian Church had evolved into an essentially
secular facility by 1981. The home received most of its funds from government
sources, hired employees without regard to religion, took children solely from state
agency referrals, and obtained parental consent before resident children attended
[Vol. 51914
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of an organization must be decided on a case-by-case basis by determining
whether the institution is operated in a pervasively religious manner. 6 Only
those organizations which are religious organizations will be accorded First
Amendment protection through the free exercise clause and the establishment
clause.
The free exercise clause has been interpreted to protect individuals3 7 and
religious organizations38 from governmental intrusion upon their religious
Christian church services. Id. at 64. However, in State v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 227
Kan. 244, 607 P.2d 1102, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 802 (1980), the court held that
a children's home with the purpose of providing "housing, facilities, care and de-
tention for wayward, homeless or delinquent individuals ... to preach the Word of
God, lead individuals to trust Christ as Saviour and Lord, reach out with his love
and compassion to those whose lives have been broken and marred by sin, and thus
rescue the perishing," remains a religious institution. Id. at 1104.
36. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with
Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 403 (1984). The Supreme
Court has clarified the term "pervasively religious" in cases dealing with parochial
schools. For example, in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973), parochial schools which exhibited the following characteristics
were found to be pervasively religious: the schools imposed religious restrictions on
student admissions, they required pupils to attend religious activities, they required
pupils to adhere to the doctrines and dogma of a particular faith, they required pupils
to attend instruction in the theology of the faith, the schools were an integral part
of the mission of their sponsoring churches, they had as a substantial purpose the
inculcation of religious values, they imposed religious restrictions on faculty employ-
ment, and they imposed religious restrictions on how and what the faculty could
teach. Id. at 767-68.
The Supreme Court has never had occasion to rule on the Christian Science
Monitor's status as a pervasively religious institution. However, in Feldstein, 555 F.
Supp. 974, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts em-
phasized the following factors in holding the Monitor to be a religious organization:
the stated purpose of the Monitor is to promote and extend the Christian Science
religion; every member of the Christian Science Church must subscribe to the Monitor;
the Board of Trustees of the Christian Science Church is directed to conduct the
business of the Monitor on a strictly Christian basis, for the promotion of the interests
of Christian Science; the Christian Science Church routinely subsidizes the Monitor,
which would otherwise operate at a significant loss; the Monitor's building is provided
by the Christian Science Church; and the Monitor refuses on religious grounds to
carry advertisements for a number of products such as tobacco and liquor. Id. at
977.
37. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38. Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLtIM. L. REv.
1373, 1388 (1981). However, the United States Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the question of whether an organization as an organization may assert a free
exercise claim. All cases which the Court has decided on free exercise grounds have
involved the rights of individuals. In School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),
the Court stated that the free exercise clause "recognizes the value of religious train-
ing, teaching and observance, and more particularly, the right of every person to
5
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liberties. Judge Nolan, writing for the majority in Madsen, apparently felt
freely choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from
the state." Id. at 222 (emphasis added). The Court stated that the purpose of the
free exercise clause is "to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any
invasions thereof by civil authority." Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
A free exercise claimant must show that the government has forced him to make
a "cruel choice" between obedience to the government and obedience to his sincerely
held religious beliefs, which resulted in a coercion of conscience. See infra notes 60-
61 and accompanying text. It would seem that an organization as an organization
would not possess a conscience capable of being coerced. However, many lower
courts, the Madsen court among them, have allowed organizations to prevail on free
exercise grounds.
In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court may have cryptically expressed
the view that an organization as an organization does not have a free exercise claim.
In Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985), a
nonprofit religious organization raised a free exercise claim in attempting to avoid
the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 303. Justice White stated
that the Foundation had standing to raise the free exercise claims of its members.
Id. at 303 n.26. However, stating that an organization has third party standing is
not equivalent to stating that an organization as an organization has a free exercise
claim. Third party standing allows the organization to assert the coercions of con-
science of the members of the organization on behalf of those members, not on behalf
of the organization as an organization. It would seem that since Justice White felt
the need to explain that the organization was being given third party standing to raise
a free exercise claim on behalf of its members, he may have been implying that the
organization as an organization did not have such a claim.
Were the United States Supreme Court directly to hold that organizations as
organizations do not have free exercise claims, much of the alleged tension between
the free exercise clause and the establishment clause could be avoided. When a court
rules in favor of a religious organization on a free exercise claim, there is the ap-
pearance that the state is advancing that religious organization over other religious
organizations or over non-religious entities, which could be interpreted as being in
violation of the establishment clause. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
This has led one commentator to state that the two clauses, set side-by-side in the
Constitution, actually intersect with one another, necessitating a zone of permissible
accommodation which the free exercise clause carves out of the establishment clause
for accommodation of free exercise rights. L. TIBE, AM AN CONSTITUONAL LAW
823 (1978). If the free exercise clause were reserved for claims of coercion of con-
science by individuals only, there would be no argument that a protection of an
individual claimant's beliefs on free exercise grounds would result in the advancement
of an entire religion, and therefore a violation of the establishment clause.
It may appear that an entire religious organization is advanced when that or-
ganization is given third party standing to assert a free exercise claim for its members
and the organization is successful on that claim. However, the underlying justification
for granting third party standing is the coercion of individual member's consciences,
not the coercion of the organization's conscience. Therefore, the advancement which
results from a successful free exercise claim asserted by an organization given third
party standing is an advancement of several individuals' religious beliefs which are
asserted collectively, not an advancement of the religious organization as an orga-
nization. The effect would be no different than if each individual had brought a
separate free exercise claim.
6
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bound to direct summary judgments in favor of the defendants as to Mad-
sen's constitutional, civil rights, breach of contract, and wrongful discharge
claims on the basis of the free exercise clause. 39 Because the defendants
established by affidavit that homosexuality is against the tenets of the Church
of Christ, Scientist, 40 the majority suggested that awarding declaratory and
injunctive relief or damages would place a substantial burden on defendants'
free exercise of their religious beliefs. 4' However, in the dissent Judge O'Con-
nor disagreed with the majority's view that judicial deference to the Monitor's
decision was necessarily dictated by the free exercise clause, 42 and instead
advocated a judicial balancing of competing Church and state interests. 43
Neither the majority nor the dissent clearly set out the complete free exercise
analysis of state interference in the Monitor's decision to dismiss Madsen.
Such analysis is helpful in evaluating this case and other church employment
cases which may arise in the future.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the first step in
judicial analysis of an alleged burden on free exercise should be to determine
39. 395 Mass. at__ , 481 N.E.2d at 1165. Although the court did not expressly
state it was deciding the case based upon the free exercise clause, the cases and
authority cited by the majority in support of its position dealt with the free exercise
clause, not the establishment clause.
40. Id. at __, 481 N.E.2d at 1164.
41. Id. at __, 481 N.E.2d at 1165.
42. Id. at -, 481 N.E.2d at 1170 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Judge O'connor
did concur in the court's direction of summary judgments for the defendants. How-
ever, Judge O'Connor would have based the summary judgments not upon the First
Amendment, but instead, upon the absence of a state interest in prohibiting sexual
preference discrimination. Id. ("Those conclusions would be correct if the controversy
were entirely unrelated to a church or church personnel."). See infra notes 87-110
and accompanying text. Due to the lack of state interest in protecting homosexual
employees, the dissent stated that the majority should not have considered the con-
stitutional question. ("I only point out that the First Amendment question is far
from simple, that the court confronts it unnecessarily, and that the court answers it
perhaps incorrectly.") Id. at __ , 481 N.E.2d at 1171 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at __ , 481 N.E.2d at 1171 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Because the
dissent felt the constitutional question should never have been reached, Judge O'Con-
nor refrained from considering the outcome of balancing the state interest and the
free exercise burden. Similar balancing language may be found in lower court opin-
ions. E.g., Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
762, 764-68 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980) ("Thus the City and County's interest in protecting
gays against discrimination and providing a remedy for it is to prevent 'strife and
unrest' and to fully utilize the City and County's 'capacities for development and
advancement.' This must be balanced against defendants' free exercise of religion
rigits."). However, reference to the free exercise clause as a balancing test may be
somewhat misleading because it implies that the free exercise burden and the state
interest are initially of equal importance. The reader should be aware, in reading
opinions which discuss balancing, that the process is not truly an even balancing.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a burden on free exercise is given
substantial weight and can be outweighed only by a state interest of the highest order.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
7
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whether the belief which is burdened is religion-based." A broad and flexible
definition of religion is necessary, as a narrow definition may exclude some
beliefs deserving of First Amendment protection. As a result, courts have
been hesitant to precisely define "religion" or "religion-based belief."' 45 The
Supreme Court has been more precise in defining what a religious belief is
not, than what it is. 46
The determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice is more often
than not a difficult and delicate task .... However, the resolution of that
question is not to turn upon judicial perception of the particular belief or
practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, con-
sistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection.47
The Court's imprecision in defining "religious belief" was based on its belief
that the judiciary is not a competent tribunal to judge ecclesiastical matters. 48
Lower courts have been somewhat more precise in developing a workable defini-
tion of religion. 49 The following three factors have been identified as useful
indicia to determine the existence of a religion:
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do
with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is comprehensive
in nature; it consists of a belief system as opposed to an isolated teaching.
Third, a religion often can be recognized by the presence of certain formal
and external signs.4 I
The Madsen court accepted the Monitor's rejection of homosexuality as a
religion-based belief.' The court based its conclusion on an affidavit sub-
44. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) ("Only beliefs rooted
in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special
protection to the exercise of religion.").
45. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of
Discrimination of Religious Organizations, 79 COLuM. L. Rav. 1514, 1516 (1979).
46. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 716. The absence of any precise definition of "religion" or "reli-
gion-based belief" has led one commentator to state that any belief which is arguably
religious should be considered as such in a court's free exercise analysis. L. TRIBE,
supra note 38, at 826-33. However, as the Supreme Court stated in Thomas, 450
U.S. at 715, "One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise
Clause." E.g., Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (claimant's ar-
gument that his religous beliefs mandated the consumption of cat food was rejected
by the court), aff'd, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979).
49. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982); International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 438-41 (2d. Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208-09
(3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring); Founding Church of Scientology v. United
States, 409 F.2d 1116, 1160 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
50. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981).
51. 395 Mass. at - , 481 N.E.2d at 1164.
8
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mitted by the defendants, and correctly declined to delve into an analysis of
the beliefs of the church.5 2
The second step in judicial analysis of a free exercise claim is to deter-
mine whether the religion-based belief is sincerely held by the claimant. 3 In
a case such as Madsen, where a religious organization, as opposed to an
individual, is asserting a free exercise claim,5 4 a court may be able to make
this determination as it decides whether the belief is religion-based. 5 It is
possible, albeit unlikely, that a church might be insincere in claiming that
an employee's lifestyle violated a religion-based belief in order to fire a
particular employee for other reasons.56 The sincerity requirement is an at-
tempt to deter such fraudulent claims. 5 However, considering the deference
that courts give to church statements of ecclesiastical matters,58 a court is
not likely to rigorously question the sincerity of a church's doctrinal claims.
The Madsen court properly accepted the Monitor's contention that homo-
sexuality is against the tenets of the Church. 9
The third step in judicial analysis of a free exercise claim is to determine
ivhether the government is putting the claimant in the position of having to
make a "cruel choice" between obedience to the government and obedience
to the sincerely-held religious belief, resulting in a coercion of conscience.6°
Had the Madsen court granted Madsen relief, it would have placed the
Monitor in the "cruel choice" position of choosing between obedience to
the Church's belief that homosexuality is a sin, and obedience to the state.
When the claimant is in fact forced to make such a choice, a burden on the
claimant's free exercise of religion may result'.6 However, in order for there
to exist a free exercise violation, the burden on the claimant's free exercise
of religion must be substantial.62 It is within this step of the free exercise
analysis that a complete explanation of the majority's logic would have been
most helpful. The majority failed to discuss the substantiality of the burden
that would have been placed upon the Monitor's free exercise of religion if
Madsen had been awarded declaratory and injunctive relief or money dam-
52. Id.
53. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
54. See supra note 38.
55. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
56. No cases were found which demonstrated this type of fact situation.
57. Bagni, supra note 45, at 1519. ("The fear is that the unscrupulous would
otherwise try to use 'religious belief' as a subterfuge for engaging in impermissible
conduct not genuinely motivated by religious conscience.").
58. E.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Men may believe
what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines
or beliefs.").
59. 395 Mass. at - , 481 N.E.2d at 1165.
60. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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ages for her dismissal. Instead, the court simply deferred to the Monitor's
decision, concluding that to do otherwise would be a free exercise violation. 6'
The majority first cited Walker v. First Presbyterian Church4 to support
the proposition that awarding declaratory and injunctive relief or damages
against the Monitor would have resulted in a substantial burden on free
exercise.65 In Walker, a church organist was discharged by the First Orthodox
Presbyterian Church of San Francisco after he admitted his homosexuality
and refused to repent. 66 The court held:
If Mr. Walker were allowed to collect damages from defendants because he
was discharged for being gay, defendants would be penalized for their re-
ligious belief that homosexuality is a sin for which one must repent to be
accepted as a part of the group that leads the congregation in worship. It
forces defendants to pay general and special damages, plus punitive damages
to maintain their religious beliefs. This is a substantial burden on defendant's
right to free exercise of religion.-
The majority also cited Lewis ex rel. Murphy v. Buchanan 6 to further
uphold the finding of a substantial burden on free exercise. In Murphy, the
pastor of a Roman Catholic church withdrew an offer of parochial school
employment to the plaintiff, a music teacher, after receiving information that
the plaintiff was homosexual. 9 The court held that forcing the defendant to pay
damages would deprive him of his right to free exercise of religion. 70
The Madsen majority failed to note that in both Walker and Murphy,
the plaintiff's activities were much more closely involved with the actual
religious activities of the respective defendants than were Madsen's. The
Walker court emphasized that as the church organist, Walker was part of
the "worship team," with duties which included playing at Sunday worship
services, communions, and baptisms.7
The plaintiff in Murphy was to be employed as a music teacher in a
Roman Catholic school.7 Parochial schools are religious institutions orga-
nized for the purpose of transmitting a religion's doctrines and values to
succeeding generations. Parochial school teachers are charged by the church
with carrying out that purpose. 7 As a parochial school teacher, Murphy
63. 395 Mass. at -, 481 N.E.2d at 1165.
64. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980).
65. Madsen, 395 Mass. at __, 481 N.E.2d at 1165.
66. Walker, 22 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 763.
67. Id. at 764.
68. 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 696 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1979).
69. Id. at 697.
70. Id. at 698.
71. Walker, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 763.
72. Murphy, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 697.
73. Laycock, supra note 38, at 1411.
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol51/iss3/11
CHURCH EMPLOYMENT
would have been involved in an actual religious activity of the Roman Cath-
olic Church.
For a court to attempt to regulate the hiring and firing of those persons
involved in essentially ecclesiastical activities of the church would certainly
place a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. 74 However, the
Madsen dissent stated that it has never been established that the state cannot
interfere in matters involving lay church employees with secular duties. 75 The
dissent seems to be arguing that as the distance of the employee from the
religious functions of the religious organization increases, the substantiality
of the burden placed on the organization's free exercise of religion decreases.
This position has found some support among commentators.
Professor Bagni has suggested that the activities and relationships of
religious organizations should be viewed as three concentric circles revolving
around an epicenter.76 In the epicenter are the purely spiritual aspects of the
church, such as church/clergy relationships, church membership policies,
religious educational programs, and church-affiliated schools which teach
secular subjects with a decidedly religious orientation.7
The first emanation from the epicenter represents church- sponsored
community activities, and relationships between the church and its support
employees with some religious or quasi- religious functions. The second em-
anation includes the church's secular business activites, and relationships
between the church and its employees who perform entirely secular functions.
The third emanation represents the secular world.78 The further removed.a
church activity is from the epicenter, Professor Bagni argues, the greater the
possibility that the state could regulate the activity without substantially bur-
dening the church's free exercise of religion. 79
However, it would seem that to analyze the substantiality of the free
exercise burden in accordance with an employee's proximity to the epicenter
of church activities would be to reintroduce the requirement that a belief be
central to the religion before a free exercise burden could exist. 80 The cen-
74. It is firmly established that the state may not interfere in a church's
employment decisions concerning a minister. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army,
460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 1050
(1972) (where the court held that the Salvation Army could discriminate against a
female minister on the basis of sex, notwithstanding the Title VII prohibition against
sex-based discrimination, because the Church's actions were protected by the First
Amendment).
75. 395 Mass. at -, 481 N.E.2d at 1170.
76. Bagni, supra note 45, at 1539.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1540.
80. This analysis assumes that the religious belief in question is that the church
should not employ a person of this type, e.g., a homosexual.
19861
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trality requirement was rejected by the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review
Bd.8' As long as the belief is religion-based and sincerely held, there is no
longer a requirement that the belief be central to the religion before a believer
has a free exercise claim. 82 If the believer is put in the position of having to
choose between obedience to his sincerely held belief, regardless of its cen-
trality, and obedience to the state, a coercion of conscience and a substantial
burden on free exercise result." Therefore, the Madsen majority, despite its
lack of explanation, was correct in finding a substantial burden on the Mon-
itor's free exercise of religion, regardless of the distance between Madsen's
duties and the actual religious activities of the Christian Science Church.
The state may justify a substantial burden on free exercise only by
proving that the burden is necessary in order to achieve a compelling state
interest. If there is no compelling state interest, a church's right to free
exercise will automatically prevail over the employee's claims. 84
Because the Madsen majority deferred to the Monitor's decision on free
exercise grounds, the court did not address the question of whether Massa-
chusetts has a compelling state interest in protecting homosexuals from em-
ployment discrimination. However, the Madsen dissent stated that nothing
in the United States or Massachusetts Constitutions, federal or state statutes,
or public policy prohibits an employer, religious or non- religious, from firing
an employee at will on the facts of this case.8" Judge O'Connor seems to
have been implying that as to the claims which were disposed of by summary
judgment, the state of Massachusetts had no express interest in protecting
homosexuals from employment discrimination.16
The existence of a state interest in protecting homosexual employees
from employment discrimination is far from clear.8 7 Possible ways a state
81. 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981); see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
82. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.
83. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
84. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
85. 395 Mass. at __ , 481 N.E.2d at 1169-70.
86. Judge O'Connor's statement that General Law chapter 151B, section 4,
does not preclude employment discrimination based upon sexual preference would
seem to indicate that the state interest referred to was the interest in protecting
homosexual employees from discrimination. Id. at__ , 481 N.E.2d at 1170 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). However, Judge O'Connor later refers to balancing the state's interest
in the enforcement of its citizens' contract rights. Id. at __, 481 N.E.2d at 1171
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Therefore, it is unclear as to precisely which state interest
Judge O'Connor referred.
87. A recent case, Under 21 v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482 N.E.2d
1, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1985), illustrates the uncertainty which exists over whether there
is in fact a state interest in protecting homosexuals from employment discrimination.
The mayor of New York issued Executive Order No. 50 "to ensure compliance with
equal employment opportunity requirements of the City, State and Federal law in
City contracting." Id. at - , 482 N.E.2d at 3, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 524. The order
applied to virtually all New York City contracts and required all those entering into
[Vol. 51
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interest may be shown include local ordinances or state statutes prohibiting
sexual preference discrimination in employment, or interpretation of Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act88 to include homosexuals.
A number of cities have enacted some type of local gay rights ordi-
nance. 9 Most of these ordinances protect only municipal employees and fail
to extend coverage to homosexuals employed in the private sector. 90 However,
if a locality has enacted a gay rights ordinance which deals with private
employment, it may serve as some evidence of a state interest in protecting
homosexuals from employment discrimination. 9'
such contracts to ensure equal employment opportunities in all employment decisions.
Id. Included in the definition of equal employment opportunity was a prohibition on
discrimination based upon sexual or affectional preference. Id. Regulations enacting
Executive Order No. 50 required that city contracts include language which stated
that the contractor agreed not to discriminate in any employment decision on thp
basis of sexual orientation or affectional preference. Id. Agudath Israel, the Salvation
Army, and a not-for-profit corporation of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New
York, all of which contract to provide social services for the city, filed actions against
the city, claiming that the portion of Executive Order No. 50 pertaining to sexual
orientation or affectional preference was beyond the scope of the mayor's authority,
and, therefore, was void. Id. The Court of Appeals of New York found for the
plaintiffs, stating that the portion of Executive Order No. 50 dealing with sexual
preference was an unlawful usurpation of the legislative power of the city council.
Id. at -, 482 N.E.2d at 10, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 531. The court emphasized that neither
Congress, the state legislature, nor the city council had enacted legislation prohibiting
sexual preference discrimination in private employement. Id. at -, 482 N.E.2d at 6,
492 N.Y.S.2d at 527. The court held that without an express state interest in pros-
cribing such discrimination, the mayor could not broaden the class of persons pro-
tected from discrimination in private employment on the basis of sexual preference.
Id., 482 N.E.2d at 6-7, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 527-28. The court also stated that because
the conduct of the private contractors such as the plaintiffs did not rise to the level
of state action, the mayor did not have the power to prohibit sexual preference
discrimination on an equal protection basis. Id. at __, 482 N.E.2d at 8, 492 N.Y.S.2d
at 529. The court declined to decide what level of equal protection scrutiny should
be applied to governmental employment discrimination based upon sexual preference.
Id. at __, 482 N.E.2d at 10, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
89. A list of cities which have enacted local gay rights ordinances is available
from the National Gay Rights Task Force, 80 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York
10011. This list is updated quarterly.
90. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation in the Mid Eighties, 10 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 459, 480-81 (1985).
91. In Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
762 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980), the state interest was expressed by the San Francisco
Police Code, which forbade employment discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. In Lewis ex rel. Murphy v.
Buchanan, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 696 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1979), the plaintiff
relied on St. Paul city ordinance section 74.03, which provided that no employer could
discriminate in hiring or firing on the basis of affectional or sexual preference. Al-
though the ordinance was in effect at the time of the lawsuit, it was later repealed.
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Wisconsin is the only state at present which has enacted a civil rights
law which expressly protects homosexuals from private employment discrim-
ination. 92 However, the California Labor Code 9 has been interpreted to pro-
hibit private employers from discriminating against openly homosexual
employees. 94 Outside of Wisconsin and California's enactments, state legis-
lation appears to be a barren ground for finding a state interest.
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 95 also offers little in the way of
expressing a state interest in protecting homosexuals from employment dis-
crimination. Title VII originally prohibited discrimination by private em-
ployers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.9 6
Subsequently, federal statutes were enacted which prohibited discrimination
on the basis of age97 or handicap.99
Sexual orientation has not found protection as one of the enumerated
characteristics covered by Title VII or by subsequent legislation." Courts
have refused to bring sexual orientation under the ambit of Title VII.1'0
Reasons cited have included legislative intent to protect only the enumerated
classes,' 0' and an interpretation of the term "sex" as not including sexual
orientation. 0 2 The interpretation of Title VII appears, at least at the present
See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. In a related case, Gay Rights Coalition
of Georgetown Univ. v. Georgetown Univ., 496 A.2d 567 (App. D.C.), vacated,
496 A.2d 587 (App. D.C. 1985) (en banc), the Gay People of Georgetown Univer-
sity and the Gay Rights Coalition at the Georgetown University Law Center used
the District of Columbia Human Rights Act to contend that Georgetown Univer-
sity was required to grant them university recognition. Id. at 568. The Act prohibits
discrimination by educational institutions on the basis of sexual preference. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the university must grant recognition
to the two groups, as the District of Columbia's interest in enforcing its Human
Rights Act substantially outweighed the burden placed upon Georgetown's religious
beliefs. Id. at 582.
92. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ I11.32, .321, .322, .36(d) (West Supp. 1983-84).
93. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1980).
94. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 489,
595 P.2d 592, 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33 (1979).
95. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
96. Id.
97. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
98. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982).
99. E.g., Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 1454
Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Ed-
ucation and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1982).
100. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Had
Congress intended more, surely the legislative history would have at least mentioned
its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites or transsexuals, and would
no doubt have sparked an interesting debate. There is not the slightest suggestion in
the legislative record to support an all-encompassing interpretation."), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2023 (1985).
101. De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).
102. Id.
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time, to preclude its use to show state interest in protecting homosexuals
from employment discrimination.0 3
The Supreme Court has emphasized that only a state interest "of the
highest order. . .not otherwise served can overbalance the interest protected
by the free exercise clause."'0 4 It would seem that, considering the present
view of homosexuality taken by legislatures and courts in most jurisdic-
tions, 0 a religious organization is likely to be successful in arguing that there
is no such compelling state interest in prohibiting private employers from
discriminating against homosexual employees, even if an anti-discrimination
statute has been enacted. In two cases specifically dealing with discrimination
by churches against homosexual employees, courts have held that the state
interest expressed in local gay rights ordinances is not sufficiently compelling
to override the church's free exercise claims. In Walker,1"6 the court held
that a church's free exercise rights in dismissing a homosexual church organist
overrode the city's interest in protecting homosexual employees from dis-
crimination, as expressed in the local gay rights ordinance. 0 7 In Lewis ex rel.
Murphy v. Buchanan, "0 the court, citing Cantwell v. Connecticut,0 9 stated
that religious conscience may not be invaded unless there is a clear and present
danger to a substantial interest of the state. The court held that the city
government's interest in protecting the employability of homosexuals is not
such a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the state that it
should overrride a church's right to withdraw an offer of employment to a
homosexual music teacher."10
If at some future time the state does express a compelling state interest
in protecting homosexuals which is found to be sufficient to overcome a free
exercise burden, the court would still have to find that the state's interest
was being served by the least restrictive means possible.I" Remedies available
against a religious institution may be placed on a continuum of restrictiveness.
103. Even if sexual orientation were to be included within the protected clas-
sifications of Title VII, application of Title VII to a religious employer might be held
unconstitutional on free exercise grounds. E.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d
553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 1050 (1972) (ap-
plication of Title VII to the church-minister relationship would be unconstitutional);
Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (application of Title VI to the discharge of a church-clerical em-
ployee relationship is not unconstitutional where there was no evidence that the
discharge was based on the doctrinal policies of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church).
104. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
105. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
106. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980).
107. Id. at 765.
108. 21 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 696, 698 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1979).
109. 310 U.S: 296, 311 (1940).
110. Murphy, 21 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 698.
111. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
19861 925
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Although a court would have to examine the specific circumstances of each
case, a plausible least-restrictive to most-restrictive continuum would be
denial of government benefits," 2 money damages, and forced reinstatement
of the employee.
As previously stated, the Madsen majority failed to thoroughly analyze
the free exercise issues in the case. Even if they had done so, it appears that
the end result would have been the same. Madsen's claims under the United
States and Massachusetts Constitutions, her claims under the Massachusetts
civil rights statutes, and her claims for breach of contract and wrongful
discharge would have been dismissed by summary judgment." 3 However, the
summary judgments would not have been granted out of a complete deference
to the free exercise of religion.' ' 4 Instead, the summary judgments would
have been based on the lack of a compelling state interest in protecting
homosexuals from discrimination by private employers. "'
Because Madsen's job as a sportswriter was a significant distance from
the "epicenter" of the Church of Christ, Scientist's religious activities, some
would argue that the burden on free exercise was not substantial. 116 However,
since there is no requirement that the burdened belief be central to the
religion, it appears that the cruel choice position in which the Church was
put resulted in a substantial burden on its free exercise of religion.' 7 In
addition, without a compelling state interest in protecting homosexual em-
ployees from discrimination by private employers, there was nothing to over-
come the free exercise burden, and the church would have prevailed.' " ,
As previously noted, the Madsen court rested its disposition of the case
entirely upon the free exercise clause. However, the Supreme Court has not
yet directly addressed the issue of whether an organization such as the Chris-
tian Science Church, as an organization may assert a free exercise claim.' 9
The establishment clause has traditionally been the constitutional provision
to which religious organizations have looked to define their relationships
with the state.' The establishment clause provides the distance between
government and religion which is necessary to protect religious organizations
from undue interference by government.' 2' It is possible for a violation of
the establishment clause to exist without a corresponding violation of the
112. E.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (religiously-
affiliated school denied tax exempt status because of a racially discriminatory admis-
sions policy).
113. Madsen, 395 Mass. at __ , 481 N.E.2d at 1167.
114. Id. at - , 481 N.E.2d at 1165.
115. See supra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 38.
120. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
121. Esbeck, supra note 36, at 348. The clause also serves to protect government
[Vol. 51
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free exercise clause because an establishment clause violation need not go to
the extreme of causing a coercion of conscience.'2 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,'23
the Supreme Court set out its tripartite test for determining whether govern-
ment action is constitutional under the establishment clause.
First, the statute must have a secular purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ...
[and] finally, the statute must not foster excessive entanglement with reli-
gion .... 2 4
Although the Madsen court rested its resolution of the case on the free
exercise clause, 25 an establishment clause analysis may be helpful in the
resolution of future disputes which may arise when religious organizations
dismiss their employees. 2 6
Legislation prohibiting discrimination by private employers against hom-
osexual employees would meet the Lemon secular purpose test. A local gay
rights ordinance, 2 7 a state anti-discrimination statte, 12 or an interpretation
of Title VII to include homosexuality' 9 would serve the secular purpose of
from religious organizations that would seek to use government to further their.
religious goals. Id.
122. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). For example,
in the context of the Madsen case, if Massachusetts had passed a statute giving a one-time
subsidy to all religious organizations which, at the time of the passage of the statute, had
homosexual employees, an establishment clause violation would exist. However, there
would be no free exercise violation, as no coercion of conscience would result from
passage of the statute. No claimant would be prohibited from following the dictates
of his religion or forced to do something against his religion. See Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), for a discussion of the standing re-
quirement in such a case.
123. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
124. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
125. 395 Mass. at -, 481 N.E.2d at 1165.
126. The usual establishment clause case involves some type of government
legislation. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (concerning an Alabama
statute which authorized a period of silence for voluntary prayer or meditation in
public schools); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (concerning statutory
exemption from conscription for persons who objected to war). However, the Su-
preme Court has also interpreted the establishment clause to prohibit civil court
resolution of intrafaith disputes where no government legislation was involved. See,
e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (involving
the reorganization of a diocese of the Church and a bishop's removal from office).
Therefore, establishment clause issues could have been raised by the Madsen litigants.
In addition, other cases which arise when a religious organization dismisses an em-
ployee may involve the application of a statute. E.g., Walker v. First Presbyterian
Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980) (applying the
San Francisco Police Code).
127. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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prohibiting employment discrimination against homosexuals. 30 A religious
organization would stand little chance of successfully arguing that the statute
did not serve a secular purpose.
A religious organization could make the argument that to apply a statute
prohibiting sexual preference discrimination to a church which has dismissed
an employee on the basis of his homosexuality would have the primary
effect 3' of inhibiting religions which hold homosexuality to be a violation
of their tenets.'3 2 Resolution of such an argument may turn on the extent to
which the employee is involved in the actual religious activities of the or-
ganization.' Were the dismissed employee a minister, the religious organi-
zation would have a strong argument that the primary effect of applying an
antidiscrimination statute to the organization would be an inhibition of re-
ligion. However, with an employee such as Madsen, whose duties do not
directly contribute to the worship, propagation, or inculcation of an orga-
nization's faith, the church's primary effect argument does not rest on such
solid ground. A court could conceivably hold that to regulate the dismissal
of an employee like Madsen would have a de minimis effect on religion.
130. Additional secular purposes may include full utilization of the available
work force and prevention of unrest. Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA), 762, 763 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980).
131. Primary effect must be determined by examining the effect of applying
the statute to the religious organization. If primary effect were determined by ex-
amining the effect of applying the statute to society as a whole, almost any statute
with a secular purpose would have a secular primary effect. For example, if a statute
which authorized a government subsidy to all schools were examined as to its effect
on society as a whole, it would be determined to have the secular purpose and primary
effect of supporting schools. However, if the statute were examined as to its effect
on parochial schools, its primary effect would be determined to be an advancement
of religion.
132. In Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1980), the church made such a claim. Conversely, the homosexual em-
ployee claimed that exempting a religious organization from a statute which prohibited
employment discrimination against homosexuals constituted governmental promotion of
religious which consider homosexuality a sin. Note, The Boundaries of a Church's First
Amendment Rights as an Employer, 31 CASE W. REs. 363, 376-77 (1981). However, the
court did not address these claims, but instead based its resolution of the case on the free
exercise clause. Walker, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 765.
133. See Esbeck, Toward a General Theory of Church-State Relations and the
First Amendment, 4 ST. Louis U. PuB. L.F. 325 (1985). The author identifies two
levels of religious activities. At the first level are those activities comprising the
worship, propagation, and inculcation of an organization's faith. At the second level
are those activities which are responses to an organization's faith, such as educational
and social welfare activities. Id. at 341-43. Government should have no control over
first level activities absent a compelling state interest. However, limited government
regulation of second level activities is proper, notwithstanding the fact that the state
interest is paternalistic rather than compelling. Id. at 342-43. Madsen's duties as a
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A religious organization's most promising establishment clause argument
in claiming protection for its decision to dismiss an employee is that, were
a civil court to interfere with the organization's decision, excessive entangle-
ment would result. Excessive government entanglement with religion may
arise when the government becomes involved in essentially religious disputes
such as the discharge or discipline of an employee. 3 4 The highest degree of
entanglement would result from application of a prohibition on sexual pref-
erence discrimination to a church's decision to dismiss an employee with
actual religious duties, such as a minister.'35 However, excessive entanglement
may still be present where the duties of the employee are not central to
church religious activities. A suit by any homosexual church employee con-
tending that his dismissal was on the basis of his sexual preference would
necessitate an inquiry into the church's motivation for dismissal. Such an
inquiry would likely rise to the level of excessive entanglement.
The liberal discovery process preceeding a civil suit could allow a court
to become deeply involved in church affairs. If an investigation were assigned
to a review board, the board inquiry might also result in excessive entangle-
ment. In NLRB v. Catholic Archbishop,3 6 the Court stated, "It is not only
the conclusions that may be reached by the [investigative] Board which may
impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but the very process
of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions.'137 Therefore, it appears that
even if the Madsen litigants had raised establishment clause issues, the out-
come of the case would have been the same. An investigation into the Church's
motivation for dismissal and the sincerity of that motivation would have
resulted in the excessive entanglement forbidden by the establishment clause.
Although the Madsen court properly dismissed on First Amendment
grounds Madsen's claims under the United States and Massachusetts Con-
134. Esbeck, supra note 36, at 390 n.253. "The Supreme Court's entanglement
discussions evidence a sensitivity to the harm that results to religious organizations
when ... government becomes entangled in prolonged monitoring or oversight of
religious personnel, resulting in alteration of or prejudice to religious duties." Id. at
384-85.
135. In Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929),
the petitioner challenged a decision by the Archbishop of Manila who had refused
to appoint the petitioner to the chaplaincy because he did not possess the qualifications
required by Canon Law. The Court held, "[Tihe decisions of church tribunals on
matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation
before the secular cours as conclusive ...... Id. at 16. In Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976), the United States Supreme Court stated that
when the Illinois Supreme Court ordered a church to reinstate a bishop who espoused
views contrary to those of the church hierarchy, the court had unconstitutionally under-
taken the resolution of a religious controversy which the First Amendment commits
exclusively to the church.
136. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
137. Id. at 502.
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stitutions, her claims under the Massachusetts civil rights statutes and her
claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge, the court affirmed the
lower court's denial of summary judgment with regard to Madsen's right to
privacy claim and her tort claims of defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, interference with advantageous relations, and interference
with her employment contract. The court directed that Madsen be allowed
to replead these claims in a manner sufficient to state a cause of action.2 38
Citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 9 the court emphasized that while the free-
dom to hold any religious belief is absolute, the freedom to act upon that
belief is not.' 40 The court stated, "Under the banner of the First Amendment
provisions on religion, a clergyman may not with impunity defame a person,
intentionally inflict serious emotional harm on a parishioner, or commit other
torts." 41
It appears that the court was issuing a caveat to religious organizations.
Although the First Amendment may protect a religious organization's right
to dismiss a homosexual employee, there are limits to the manner in which
the organization may carry out the dismissal. Actions which rise to the level
of tortious conduct against the employee will not be tolerated under the guise
of First Amendment protection.' 42 For example, had the Monitor published
an article on the front page detailing Madsen's dismissal and her alleged
homosexual activities, the Monitor might have been held liable for invasion
of Madsen's privacy. Although the Monitor's right to dismiss Madsen would
have been protected by the First Amendment, its actions in publishing the
story would not have been, as they far surpassed the actions necessary to
effectuate the dismissal and rose to the level of invasion of her privacy.
Therefore, it would be prudent for a religious organization which feels com-
pelled by church tenets to dismiss an employee to carefully consider the
actions taken in investigating and dismissing the employee. Considering the
compassion churches should hold toward all persons, it is not unreasonable
for a court to demand that a religious organization be considerate in the
actions taken to dismiss an employee.
When a religious organization is compelled to dismiss an employee for
violation of church tenets, a number of First Amendment issues arise. This
note has explored the free exercise and establishment clause issues to be
considered when a church employer dismisses an employee.
138. 395 Mass. at -, 481 N.E.2d at 1167. The dissent would have dismissed
Madsen's tort claims because although Madsen's complaint set out a detailed state-
ment of facts, those facts did not support any claim entitling Madsen to relief. Id.
at - , 481 N.E.2d at 1169.
139. 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
140. Id. ("Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of soci-
ety.").
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A church employer stands the greatest chance of free exercise protection
when the following conditions exist: the church holds a religion-based belief
that rejects the employee's lifestyle, 43 the belief is sincerely held by the
church,'" the church is put into the "cruel choice" position of having to
choose between obedience to its religious belief or obedience to the state,
resulting in coercion of conscience,' 45 and the jurisdiction has no ordinance
or statute expressing a state interest in protecting homosexuals from em-
ployment discrimination.'"
A church employer's chances of finding protection within the establish-
ment clause turn on the degree of entanglement which would result from the
application of an anti-discrimination statute to the church. The greatest de-
gree of entanglement, and thus the highest level of establishment clause
protection, will exist when the employee's position is central to the church's
religious activities,' 47
However, religious employers would be wise to heed the Madsen court's
warning. Even with the guarantees of the First Amendment, a church em-
ployer will not be protected from liability if its actions in dismissing the
employee amount to tortious conduct.'
48
GAYLE A. GRIssuM
143. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
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